In discrete time markets with proportional transaction costs, Schachermayer [Sch04] shows that robust no-arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent price system.
Introduction
In frictionless finite discrete time financial market models, the absence of arbitrage opportunities is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent probability measure under which the discounted price processes are martingales. This result is called the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP). In the case of a finite probability space, it goes back to the work of Harrison and Pliska [HP81] . The extension to arbitrary probability spaces is known as the Dalang-MortonWillinger Theorem [DMW90] , whose original proof was subsequently refined by several authors, see, e.g., [Sch92] , [KS01a] . In the later proofs, the implication that, in frictionless markets, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that the set of hedgeable claims attainable from zero endowment is closed in probability is identified as the key lemma.
For a finite probability space, Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b] extend the FTAP of Harrison and Pliska to models with proportional transaction costs. They consider a general "currency model" with finitely many currencies (assets), which we also follow in the current paper. It allows to buy any asset by paying with any other asset. In this general framework, there need not exist an asset which can play the role of a bank account, i.e., an asset which can be involved in
• We want to provide an (easy to interpret) no-arbitrage condition which is as weak as possible and under which the set A of terminal portfolios attainable from zero endowment is closed.
• We want to establish a FTAP with CPSs which are not necessarily strict as in the FTAP of Schachermayer [Sch04] .
For this, we introduce a variant of (NA s ), that we call prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA ps ) and that turns out to be sufficient to guarantee that A is closed in probability (see Theorem 2.4). We say that the market model satisfies (NA ps ) iff any claim which is attainable from zero endowment by trading up to some time t and which can subsequently be liquidated for sure, can also be attained from zero endowment in the subsequent periods (here, "subsequent" is not understood in a strict sense). This means that in contrast to the (NA s ) criterion, we do not distinguish between a trade that can be realized at time t and a trade from which we know at time t for sure that it can be realized in the future.
In our proofs, we cannot rely on the vector space property of the null-strategies, which was central in the arguments of Schachermayer and Kabanov-Rásonyi-Stricker. Indeed, it was shown by Rokhlin [Rok08] that this property is equivalent to (NA r ), which is strictly stronger than (NA ps ). Our proof relies on a decomposition of the trading possibilities in "reversible" and "purely non-reversible" transactions at each point in time, where we call a transaction "reversible" if the resulting portfolio can be liquidated in the later periods for sure. This decomposition can be seen as a non-linear, only positively homogeneous generalization of the projection on the set of null-strategies that is used in the case that the null-strategies form a vector space. Given a trading strategy, we then consider only the "purely non-reversible" part at each point in time and postpone the "reversible" part to later points in time, where more information is available. This is possible by (NA ps ), and, as it turns out, sufficient to assert that A is closed in probability. Consequently, (NA ps ) implies the existence of a CPS.
On the other hand, as described above, a CPS can exist although the set A is not closed. Consequently, the existence of a CPS cannot be equivalent to (NA ps ). But, for a weak version of (NA ps ), called weak prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA wps ), we have equivalence to the existence of a CPS (see Theorem 2.8). A market satisfies (NA wps ) iff there exists an at least as favorable market which satisfies (NA ps ). Since the second market need not be strictly more favorable than the original one, (NA ps ) implies (NA wps ). Hence, we establish a FTAP, which complements those of Schachermayer [Sch04] and Kabanov-Rásonyi-Stricker [KRS02, KRS03] . The main difference is that the resulting CPS may lie on the relative boundary of the bid-ask-spread. In Section 4, Figure 1 illustrates a very simple example for this. Alternatively, one may think of an actually frictionless market that is written as a model with efficient friction in the following way. Each point in time is split into two points. Under the same information, at the first point, the investor can only buy, and at the second point she can only sell a stock. If the frictionless market satisfies (NA), the artificial market with friction has a CPS but not a SCPS. Thus, at least from a conceptual point of view, it is desirable to have a FTAP with arbitrary CPSs as well.
In the case of a finite probability space, (NA wps ) is equivalent to (NA), which means that our version of the FTAP can be seen as a generalization of the above mentioned FTAP by Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b] (see part 2 of Theorem 1 therein) to the case of arbitrary probability spaces. Finally, we motivate the (NA wps ) condition by an example which shows that (NA wps ) cannot be replaced by a further weakening of the (NA ps ) condition (see Example 4.3).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the framework of financial modeling, the prospective strict no-arbitrage condition, and the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage condition. We relate these properties to the robust no-arbitrage and the strict no-arbitrage condition and state the main results of the paper (Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.8). The proofs can be found in Section 3. In Section 4, there are two very simple examples that illustrate the differences between the above mentioned no-arbitrage conditions and a more sophisticated example (Example 4.3) that shows the effect of a possible "cascade" of approximate hedges.
2 Prospective strict no-arbitrage and consistent price systems
We now introduce the market model and the relevant notation. We work on a probability space (Ω, F, P) equipped with a discrete time filtration (F t ) T t=0 , T ∈ N, such that F T = F. The space (of equivalence classes) of
ω) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω} the set of F t -measurable selectors of N . As usual, the spaces are equipped with the topology of the convergence in probability, and we write
We work with the market model with proportional transaction costs from Schachermayer [Sch04] , where the reader may find a discussion about its economical meaning and its connection to the models of [KRS02] and [KS01b] . There are d ∈ N traded assets, and a
The terms of trade of the d assets are specified by a bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 , i.e., an adapted d×d-matrix-valued process such that for each ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ {0, . . . , T }, Π t (ω) is a bid-ask matrix. For each t ∈ {0, . . . , T }, the random matrix Π t = (π ij t ) 1≤i,j≤d specifies the exchanges available to the investor at time t. More precisely, the entry π ij t denotes the number of units of asset i for which an agent can buy one unit of asset j at time t. Therefore, the set of portfolios attainable at zero endowment at time t, which, in this context, consists of F t -measurable R d -valued random variables, is modeled by the convex cone
where e i denotes the i-th unit vector of R d . This means that each portfolio is the result of
, where λ ij denotes the units of assets j ordered in exchange for asset i, and some non-negative amount r ∈ L 0 (R d + , F t ), which corresponds to the decision of the investor to "throw away" some non-negative quantities of each assets. Next, we define for each ω ∈ Ω the polyhedral cone
In Lemma 3.1 below, we briefly verify the intuitively obvious fact that the set given in (2.1) coincides with the set L 0 (−K(Π t ), F t ) of F t -measurable selectors of the set-valued mapping ω → −K(Π t (ω)). We use this equality throughout the paper and refer to L 0 (−K(Π t ), F t ) as the set of portfolios attainable from zero endowment at time t.
Definition 2.1. An R d -valued adapted process ϑ = (ϑ t ) T t=0 is called self-financing portfolio process for the bid-ask process
where ϑ −1 := 0. Consequently, for each pair (s, t) with s, t ∈ {0, . . . , T } and s ≤ t, the convex cone of hedgeable claims attainable from zero endowment between s and t is denoted by A t s and is defined to be
For an alternative bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 , the corresponding set is denoted by A t s . The primary object of interest in this paper is the cone A T 0 of hedgeable claims attainable from zero endowment between 0 and T . However, we still need the following auxiliary notions. Let K(Π t (ω)) := −(−K(Π t (ω))) for each ω ∈ Ω, then the convex cone L 0 (K(Π t ), F t ) is called the set of solvent portfolios at time t and the (polyhedral) cone K(Π t (ω)) is called the solvency cone corresponding to the bid-ask matrix
is attainable at price zero, thus the portfolio v can be liquidated to zero and, consequently, is solvent. Similarly, let
denotes the space of a portfolios, which are attainable at zero endowment, and vice versa, are solvent.
Before we introduce our new no-arbitrage condition, we recall the concepts of no-arbitrage from the literature.
Definition 2.2 (compare to [Sch04] and [KRS03] ).
(ii) The bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the strict no-arbitrage property (
The bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA r ) if there is a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with smaller bid-ask spreads in the sense that the spread
, . . . , T } and almost all ω ∈ Ω, such that ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (NA).
We just note that in the case of vanishing bid-ask spreads, condition (2.5) is satisfied by the choice of Π = Π, i.e., frictionless markets are not excluded.
It is well known that although each of the cones L 0 (−K(Π t ), F t ) is closed with regard to the convergence in probability, the cone A T 0 may fail to be closed. As already mentioned, neither (NA) nor (NA s ) are strong enough to guarantee that A T 0 is closed (see Examples 3.1 and 3.3 in [Sch04] ). This is in contrast to the frictionless case, where (NA) is sufficient (see, e.g., Theorem 6.9.2 in [DS06] ). In the present context Schachermayer [Sch04] showed that the robust noarbitrage condition (NA r ) is strong enough to assure that A T 0 is closed. We now introduce a slight weakening of (NA r ) called prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA ps ), which is still sufficient to guarantee that A T 0 is closed.
Definition 2.3. The bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage property (NA ps ) if
The (NA ps ) property has the following interpretation: any claim v ∈ A t 0 attained by trading up to time t which can be reduced to the zero portfolio in t or in the subsequent periods, i.e., −v ∈ A T t , has to be attainable by trading between t and T only. It is a variant of the (NA s ) condition, that postulates that any claim v ∈ A t 0 which can be liquidated at time t, i.e., v ∈ L 0 (K(Π t ), F t ), has to be attainable at time t as well. The difference is that we do not distinguish between a trade at time t and a trade from which one knows for sure at time t that it can be realized in the future. We can already formulate the first main result of the paper:
Theorem 2.4. If the bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 has the prospective strict no-arbitrage property (NA ps ), then the convex cone A T 0 is closed with regard to the convergence in probability. This theorem has obvious consequences for the existence of dual variables. For a given bidask matrix Π, the (positive) dual cone
, this induces the set-valued process (K ⋆ (Π t )) T t=0 of dual cones. We can now define the notion of consistent price systems, which is dual to the notion of self-financing portfolio process and plays a similar role as the notion of an equivalent martingale measure in the frictionless theory. Once again for a detailed discussion of the economical interpretation we refer to [Sch04] .
We have the following consequence of Theorem 2.4. Corollary 2.6. If the bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage condition (NA ps ), then it admits a consistent price system (CPS). More generally, for any given strictly positive
In general the opposite fails to be true as illustrated by, e.g., Example 1 in Section 3.2.4 in [KS09] . We can however establish an equivalence if we pass from (NA ps ) to a weaker notion of prospective strict no-arbitrage.
Definition 2.7. The bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage property (NA wps ) if there is a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T , such that ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage condition (NA ps ). The (NA wps ) condition is obviously a weakening of the (NA ps ) condition since the bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 in Definition 2.7 need not be strictly more favorable than (Π t ) T t=0 . The difference between the two conditions is illustrated in Example 4.2 below. Our second main result is the following fundamental theorem of asset pricing.
Theorem 2.8. A bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage condition (NA wps ) if and only if it admits a consistent price system (CPS).
Remark 2.9. Theorem 2.8 extends part 2 of Theorem 1 in Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b] to the case of infinite probability spaces. Combining these two theorems, it can be seen that (NA wps ) possesses the nice property that it is equivalent to (NA) if |Ω| < ∞.
Remark 2.10. In addition, (NA) and (NA wps ) coincide in the case of only two assets on arbitrary probability spaces, which follows from the equivalence of (NA) and the existence of a CPS, derived by Grigoriev [Gri05] .
The (NA wps ) property is not sufficient to assure that A T 0 is closed in probability. However, we have the following obvious consequence of Theorem 2.8.
Corollary 2.11. If a bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage condition (NA wps ), then we have
The short proof is also deferred to Section 3.
Remark 2.12. (NA wps ) postulates the existence of a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 such that Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and
(2.6)
One may ask if one can replace this condition with the following slightly weaker condition: there exists a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfying (NA), such that Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and
(by Proposition 2.13, (2.6) implies that Π satisfies (NA), which means that the second condition is a weakening of the first one). In condition (2.7), the position at time t is achieved by trading in the original market, only its "evaluation" is made in the more favorable market model Π. But, maybe surprisingly, it turns out that (2.7) does not exclude the existence of an approximate arbitrage and thus a CPS need not exist (see Example 4.3 below).
Proposition 2.13. We have the following implications
Remark 2.14. All implications in (2.8) are strict (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2 below; for (NA) ⇒ (NA wps ), consider an arbitrage-free model with an approximate arbitrage, Example 3.1 in [Sch04] , and apply Corollary 2.11). In addition, (NA s ) is neither necessary nor sufficient for (NA ps ). Indeed, (NA ps ) ⇒ (NA s ) is straightforward. (NA s ) ⇒ (NA ps ) follows from Example 3.3 in [Sch04] .
Proof of Proposition 2.13. Ad (NA r ) ⇒ (NA ps ). Assume that the bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA r ) and let v ∈ A t 0 such that −v ∈ A T t . We have to show v ∈ A T t . According to our assumption, we have
and notice that
t , which concludes the proof of the first implication.
Ad (NA ps ) ⇒ (NA wps ). Obvious.
Ad (NA wps ) ⇒ (NA). Assume that the bid-ask process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA wps ), i.e., there exists a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA ps ).
Thus, using representation (2.1), i.e., v ≤ 1≤i,j≤d λ ij (e j − π ij T e i ) a.s. for some nonnegative random variables λ ij , and by π 1i T > 0, one has
where the second inequality holds by property (iii) of a bid-ask matrix. Together with v ∈ L 0 (R d + ), (2.9) implies that v = 0 a.s. Thus, the bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA). By Π ≤ Π, the same holds a fortiori for (Π t ) T t=0 .
Remark 2.15 (Superhedging). With Theorem 2.4, the superhedging result in Schachermayer [Sch04] (see Theorem 4.1 therein) and its proof hold one-to-one under the slightly weaker assumption that (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA ps ) instead of (NA r ) -only without the statement with "strictly consistent price systems" in the brackets.
Proofs of the main results
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.4. The other results of Section 2 are standard consequences of A T 0 being closed and thus we mainly refer to the known results in the literature and highlight the minor adjustments. The latter is postponed to the end of the section.
The main hurdle in the proof of Theorem 2.4 is that we do not have at hand that the null-strategies, i.e., the elements of (ξ 0 , .
with
T t=0 ξ t = 0 a.s., form a linear space. Namely, it is shown by Rokhlin [Rok08] that the implication
is equivalent to (NA r ), which is strictly stronger than (NA ps ). Thus, in the following we propose a new proof method which overcomes this hurdle. Before starting with the main proof, we show that L 0 (−K(Π t ), F t ) coincides with the set given in (2.1). Later, this allows us to argue directly with orders λ ∈ L 0 (R
. In order to ease notation, we define for all t = 0, . . . , T the mapping
Lemma 3.1. Let Π = (Π t ) T t=0 denote a bid-ask process. Then, we have
for all t = 0, . . . , T and, consequently, we have
We have P (ω) = ∅ for each ω ∈ Ω by virtue of v(ω) ∈ −K(Π t (ω)) for each ω ∈ Ω. In addition, the mapping ω → 1≤i,j≤d λ ij e j − π ij t (ω)e i − r is F t -measurable for each (λ, r) ∈ R d×d + × R d + , and the mapping (λ, r) → 1≤i,j≤d λ ij e j − π ij t (ω)e i − r is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω. Hence, we may apply Theorem 14.36 in [RW09] 
for each ω ∈ Ω and, consequently, we have v = L t (λ t ) − r t a.s. At last, (3.3) follows directly from (3.2).
Definition 3.2. For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, we define the (convex) cone of reversible orders at time t by
The following lemma establishes a suitable decomposition of the elements of L 0 (R d×d + , F t ) into reversible and "purely non-reversible" orders. For the decomposition, one needs that R t is closed in probability. To achieve this, the lemma assumes that A T t+1 is closed in probability, a property that is not yet shown at this place.
Lemma 3.3. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and assume that A T t+1 is closed in probability. Then for any λ ∈ L 0 (R d×d + , F t ) there is a unique pair (up to null sets) λ 1 ∈ R t and λ 2 ∈ L 0 (R d×d
where the inequality is strict on {λ 2 = λ 2 } P-a.s. and · 2 denotes the Euclidean norm on R d×d . In addition, the mappings p t :
defined by p t (λ) = λ 1 and q t (λ) = λ 2 have the following properties:
and all non-negative F t -measurable scalars µ we have p t (µλ) = µp t (λ),
We refer to p t (λ) and q t (λ) as the reversible and the purely non-reversible part of the order λ ∈ L 0 (R d×d + , F t ), respectively. The following continuity of the decomposition is the last ingredient for the proof of Theorem 2.4.
Lemma 3.4. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T −1} and assume that A T t+1 is closed in probability.
and q t (λ n ) → q t (λ) P-a.s. for n → ∞. Especially, Image(q t ) is closed in probability.
We postpone the proofs of the two lemmas to make some comments on their use. By the prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA ps ) property, reversible orders can be postponed to later periods s ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T }. Thus, any order at time t can be replaced by its purely non-reversible part at time t. On the other hand, if a sequence in A T t converges, an explosion of the purely non-reversible orders at time t can be led to a contradiction. The mapping p t plays the role of the projection of an arbitrary self-financing strategy onto the set of null-strategies in [Sch04] . There, the null-strategies form a linear subspace, which implies that the orthogonal part is automatically self-financing. This property is not available here, and thus we cannot argue with a projection, but with a more complicated decomposition.
Alternatively, the decomposition in Lemma 3.3 could also be defined on the level of portfolio
But, in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we have to argue directly with the orders λ.
For the convenience of the reader, we recall a lemma on the existence of a measurable subsequence that is applied several times in the following proofs (see, e.g. [Sch04] and [KS01a] ).
there is a random subsequence (τ k ) k∈N , i.e., a strictly increasing sequence of N-valued F tmeasurable random variables such that the sequence of random variables (g k ) k∈N given by g k (ω) := f τ k (ω) (ω), k ∈ N, converges a.s. in the one-point-compactification R d×d + ∪ {∞} to a random variable in f ∈ L 0 (R d×d + ∪ {∞}, F t ). In fact, we may find the subsequence such that
where ∞ 2 = ∞.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. First, we show the existence and uniqueness of the decomposition satisfying (3.4). Fix λ ∈ L 0 (R d×d + , F t ) and define the non-empty set
which consists of the first components of the possible decompositions of λ. Under the assumptions made, the convex cone R t is closed in probability and closed under multiplication with nonnegative F t -measurable scalars. This implies that X λ is closed in probability and closed under measurable convex combinations. We have to show that x := ess inf
is attained and the minimizer is unique. Thus, notice that the set of random variables { λ− λ 2 | λ ∈ X λ } is downward directed. Indeed, for each λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ X λ , one has λ − λ 3 2 = λ − λ 1 2 ∧ λ − λ 2 2 , where
Hence, there is a sequence of random variables (λ n ) n ⊆ X λ such that λ − λ n 2 → x P-a.s. for n → ∞. From the parallelogram law (see, e.g., Lemma 6.51 in [AB06] ) of the Euclidean norm on R d×d and the convexity of X λ , we obtain
. By the closedness of X λ , one derives the existence. Uniqueness in the postulated sense also follows from the estimate (3.5).
This means that the mappings p t and q t are well-defined and it remains to show that they satisfy the properties.
Ad (i): Let µ ≥ 0 be a F t -measurable random variable. As a consequence of R t and L 0 (R d×d + , F t ) being closed under multiplication with non-negative F t -measurable random variables, we have X µλ = {µ λ | λ ∈ X λ }. Then, the assertion follows from the construction of p t from above.
On the other hand, one has
where the inequality holds since p t (q t (λ)) is the optimal reversible part of q t (λ). By (3.7), (3.6), and the uniqueness of the optimal reversible part in the decomposition of λ, it follows that p t (λ) + p t (q t (λ)) = p t (λ) P-a.s. and thus
The assertion immediately follows from (3.8).
Ad (iii): Follows immediately from (ii).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We have to show that
The property that Image(q t ) is closed in probability immediately follows from Lemma 3.3 (ii) and (3.9) by passing to an almost surely converging subsequence. To show (3.9), we define for each n ∈ N the F t -measurable real-valued random variable
One has that µ n p t (λ) ∈ R t and λ n − µ n p t (λ) ∈ L 0 (R d×d + , F t ), i.e., µ n p t (λ) ∈ X λn . This means that we compress the transfer matrix p t (λ) to use it for a (in general not optimal) decomposition of λ n into a reversible and a non-reversible part. Note that in the trivial case that p t (λ) ij (ω) = 0 for all (i, j), the compression is irrelevant, here one has µ n (ω) = 1. As p t (λ n ) is the optimal reversible part of λ n , it follows that
(3.10)
In addition, by λ ij ≥ p t (λ) ij ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , d and λ n → λ, we have that µ n → 1 P-a.s. Combining this with the triangle inequality of the Euclidean norm, we arrive at
where the inequality follows from (3.10). Since p t (λ) is the optimal reversible part of λ, this just means that
To complete the proof, we define the
≥ 1/k for infinitely many n} that is strictly positive on the set A := {p t (λ n ) → p t (λ)} ∈ F t . Then, we construct the random subsequence (τ k ) k∈N recursively by τ 0 := 0 and
By construction, we have that
By λ n → λ and 0 ≤ p t (λ n ) ij ≤ λ ij n , one has sup n∈N p t (λ n ) 2 ≤ sup n∈N λ n 2 < ∞ P-a.s. Thus, by Lemma 3.5, there exists a random subsequence ( τ k ) k∈N of (τ k ) k∈N and an f ∈ L 0 (R d×d + , F t ) s.t. p t (λ τ k ) → f P-a.s. Together with (3.11), this implies that λ − f 2 = λ − p t (λ) 2 P-a.s.. In addition, we have f ∈ X λ . On the other hand, by (3.12), f = p t (λ) on A P-a.s. Since p t (λ) is the unique optimal reversible part of λ in the sense of Lemma 3.3, these two properties can only hold simultaneously if P (A) = 0 and we are done.
Remark 3.6. We note that for the proof of Theorem 2.4, we only need the weaker assertion that Image(q t ) is closed in probability. To show this assertion, one can restrict oneself to sequences with λ n = q t (λ n ), i.e., p t (λ n ) = 0, for all n ∈ N, and the above proof would already be completed with (3.11).
We are now in the position to prove Theorem 2.4. As in Kabanov-Rásonyi-Stricker [KRS03] we argue by induction on the periods. The key difference is that reversible orders are postponed to later periods, instead of being executed and compensated in the same period. The later is not possible since the null-strategies do not form a linear space.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Assume that the bid-ask-process (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA ps ). Let us prove by a backward induction on t = T, T − 1, . . . , 0 that A T t is closed in probability. The induction basis t = T is trivial since A T T coincides with L 0 (−K(Π T ), F T ) which is closed in probability. Induction step t + 1 t: We assume that A T t+1 is closed in probability for some t ≤ T − 1 and have to show that A T t is closed too. Therefore, let (ξ n ) n∈N be a sequence in A T t which converges to some ξ ∈ L 0 (R d ) in probability. Obviously, we may assume that ξ n → ξ almost surely by passing to a subsequence. We have to show that ξ ∈ A T t .
Step 1. According to Lemma 3.1, we may write
. Under the induction hypothesis that A T t+1 is closed in probability, we apply Lemma 3.3 in order to decompose λ n t into p t (λ n t ) + q t (λ n t ) and thus
where p t (λ n t ) is reversible and q t (λ n t ) is purely non-reversible. This means that L t (p t (λ n t )) ∈ A t 0 ∩ (−A T t+1 ). The prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA ps ) property implies that
and thus L t (p t (λ n t )) ∈ A T t+1 . This allows us to rewrite (3.13) as
with x n ∈ A T t+1 . Hence, from now on we can assume w.l.o.g. that (λ n t ) n∈N ⊆ Image(q t ).
Step 2. Our next goal is to show that P (A) = 0, where A := {lim sup n→∞ λ n t 2 = ∞}.
(3.14)
By Lemma 3.5, we may pass to a measurable subsequence (τ k ) k∈N such that for a.e. ω ∈ A we have λ
Then, by the stability of Image(q t ) under multiplication with non-negative F t -measurable scalars (see Lemma 3.3(i)), we find that λ n t := λ τ n t λ τn t 2 ½ A belongs to Image(q t ) and, in addition, we define
We have
s. Now, we may apply once again Lemma 3.5 to find a measurable subsequence (σ k ) k∈N such that
converges to −L t ( λ t ). Since A T t+1 is closed and due to Lemma 3.1, the limit can be written as
Obviously, by (NA), we must have r = 0 P-a.s. and thus we have that λ t is reversible, i.e., λ t ∈ R t = Image(p t ). However, on the other hand, the sequence ( λ σ k t ) k∈N belonged to Image(q t ), thus, by Lemma 3.4, λ t ∈ Image(q t ). Therefore λ t ∈ Image(p t ) ∩ Image(q t ), hence λ t = 0 a.s. according to Lemma 3.3 (iii). Since P(A) = P( λ t = 0), this is only possible if P (A) = 0, i.e., (3.14) holds true.
Step 3. According to step 2, we can apply Lemma 3.5 to find a measurable subsequence (τ k ) k∈N such that λ
, which, by the induction hypothesis, belongs to A T t+1 . This implies that ξ ∈ A T t .
Remark 3.7. It is worth noting that our results rely mostly on the polyhedral structure of the solvency cones and not on the specific setup. Thus our results can be extended to models with arbitrary polyhedral solvency cones without much effort. In addition, our reasoning can also be applied to models with incomplete information such as those considered in [Bou06, DVKS07] , where arguing on the level of orders is quite natural.
Finally, we finish up the remaining proofs. Notice that every result is a standard consequence of the set A T 0 being closed in probability under the (NA ps ) condition, hence we only give the respective references and point out where some changes are needed.
Proof of Corollary 2.6. It suffices to repeat the arguments on page 29 between lines 5-33 of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [Sch04] with A T 0 (instead of A T ), which is closed by Theorem 2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.8. (NA wps )⇒ ∃ CPS: According to the (NA wps ) condition there is a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T satisfying (NA ps ). Corollary 2.6 implies that ( Π t ) T t=0 admits a CPS, which is obviously a CPS for (Π t ) T t=0 as well. ∃ CPS ⇒ (NA wps ): It is again sufficient to repeat the arguments on page 30 between lines 1-12 of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [Sch04] to define a frictionless bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 , i.e., π ij t = 1/ π ji t , with Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T satisfying (NA), which in the frictionless case coincides with (NA ps ) by Proposition 2.13. Thus (Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA wps ).
Proof of Corollary 2.11. This is a well known consequence of the existence of a consistent price system. We may, for example, use Proposition 3.2.6 in [KS09] to see that the existence of a consistent price system implies
) with v n → v can easily be led to a contradiction.
(Counter-)Examples
We start with two very simple examples that illustrate the difference between (NA r ), (NA ps ), and (NA wps ) and the need to consider CPSs which do not lie in the relative interior of the bid-ask spread.
Example 4.1 ((NA ps ) ⇒ (NA r )). We consider a two-asset one-period model with a bank account that does not pay interest and one stock with bid-price (S t ) t=0,1 and ask-price (S t ) t=0,1 . The deterministic prices are illustrated in Figure 1 below. In this special case, a (strictly) consistent price system corresponds to a pair ( S, Q) consisting of a measure Q ∼ P and a Q-martingale S taking its values in (the relative interor of ) [S, S]. For more details regarding models with a bank account see, e.g., Section 3 in [Rok08] . Obviously, the market admits the unique consistent price process S ≡ 1. S is not a strictly consistent price process since 1 / ∈ (1/2, 1). Hence, the model cannot satisfy (NA r ). Also the
) for all t, is not satisfied. On the other hand, we have that A 0 0 ∩ (−A 1 1 ) = cone e 2 − e 1 ⊆ cone e 2 − e 1 , e 1 − e 2 , −e 1 , −e 2 = A 1 1 , i.e., only a long stock position built up at time 0 can be liquidated without losses at time 1, but the purchase of the stock (asset 2) can also be postponed to time 1. Thus the model satisfies (NA ps ). The market still admits the unique consistent price process S ≡ 1, but now fails (NA ps ) since A 0 0 ∩ (−A 1 1 ) = cone e 2 − e 1 ⊆ cone e 2 − 2e 1 , e 1 − e 2 , −e 1 , −e 2 = A 1 1 . On the other hand, the model satisfies (NA wps ) since the more favorable bid-ask process in Figure 1 satisfies (NA ps ).
Finally, we provide an example showing that (NA wps ) cannot be replaced by the "next weaker" condition that there exists a more favorable market, i.e., a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with Π t ≤ Π t for each t = 0, . . . , T , such that ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA) and
for all t = 0, . . . , T (4.1) (cf. Remark 2.12). We show that there is a bid-ask process (Π t ) 3 t=0 with four assets satisfying condition (4.1) which allows for an approximate arbitrage. Hereby, in the spirit of the basic Example 3.1 of Schachermayer [Sch04] , which can be used to achieve an approximate arbitrage, the example is based on the idea of two consecutive approximate hedges. There exists a more favorable bid-ask process ( Π t ) 3 t=0 s.t. (4.1) holds, but which only turns the first approximate hedge into a perfect hedge and thus the model still satisfies (NA).
The example highlights the importance of a possible "cascade" of approximate hedges, which is, to the best of our knowledge, a phenomenon not discussed in the previous literature. It is also of interest for the discussion of adjusted bid-ask processes as introduced in Jacka, Berkaoui, and Warren [JBW08] (see Remark 4.4). and all states have positive probability. In addition, the information structure is given by F 0 = {∅, Ω},
and F 3 = 2 Ω = F. This means n is revealed at time 1, m and i are revealed at time 2 and, at last, j is revealed at time 3. Next, we define a bid-ask process (Π t ) 3 t=0 depending on parameter a > 0 for t = 0, 1 as follows
and for t = 2, 3 depending on the state (n, m, i, j) ∈ N 2 × {−1/2, 1/2} 2 as
The missing entries are specified via the direct transfer over the first asset, i.e., π
for 2 ≤ i = j ≤ 4. This means that the first asset plays the role of a money market account and the assets 2,3, and 4 represent risky stocks. Finally, we choose the parameter a prohibitively high such that the corresponding transfers are unattractive, more precisely, we set a := 5 > 4. The market is actually frictionless with special short-and long-selling constraints. Asset 2 yields the random return 1/4 + j, j ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}. It can be approximately hedged, yielding an extra profit, by the return of asset 3 between time 2 and time 3, that reads −j/m. On the other hand, asset 3 has to be bought already at time 0 which leads to the prior random return i, i ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}. The latter return can be approximately hedged by asset 4. This means that there is a cascade of approximate hedges -hedge asset 2 by asset 3 and asset 3 by asset 4 -leading to an approximate arbitrage.
Step 1. Let us show that (Π t ) 3 t=0 allows for an approximate arbitrage, i.e., A 3 0 ∩L 0 (R 4 + ) {0}. Therefore, we define for fixed k ∈ N the following strategy. For t = 0, we set
For t = 1, we define
For t = 2, we define
Finally, at t = 3 we liquidate the remaining positions in the assets 2 and 3. Thus, we define
which belongs to −K(Π 3 (n, m, i, j)).
Finally, letting k → ∞, we obtain v ∈ A T 0 given by
which is the desired asymptotic arbitrage. Hence, the model cannot admit a CPS (see Proposition 3.2.6. in [KS09] ). Next, we introduce the bid-ask process ( Π t ) 3 t=0 given by Π 0 = Π 0 , Π 2 = Π 2 , Π 3 = Π 3 , and
which satisfies Π t ≤ Π t for all t = 0, 1, 2, 3. We want to show that ( Π t ) 3 t=0 has the (NA) property and satisfies A t 0 ∩ − A T t ⊆ A T t for t = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Step 2. We start with the (NA) property for ( Π t Indeed, purchasing an asset i ∈ {2, 3, 4} at price a = 5 or short-selling it at price 1/a = 1/5 (in terms of the asset 1) leads to a sure loss after liquidating this position afterwards. Hence, we only need to consider v = ξ 0 + ξ 1 + ξ 2 + ξ 3 ∈ A 3 0 , where ξ 0 ∈ cone(e 2 − e 1 ), ξ 1 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 3 − e 1 , e 4 − e 1 ), F 1 ), ξ 2 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 1 − π 3,1 2 e 3 , e 1 − π 4,1 2 e 4 ), F 2 ), and ξ 3 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 1 − π 2,1 3 e 2 , e 1 − π 3,1 3 e 3 ), F 3 ) with the additional restrictions ξ 3 1 + ξ 3 2 ≥ 0 a.s. and ξ 4 1 + ξ 4 2 = 0 a.s. Under the assumptions above, we get
for each state (n, m, i, j) ∈ Ω with ξ 2 0 ≥ 0, ξ 3 1 (n) ≥ 0, ξ 3 2 (n, m, i) ≤ 0 and ξ 4 1 (n) ≥ 0. Hereby the notation highlights the required measurability of the random variables. We have ξ 3 1 (n) + ξ 3 2 (n, m, i) ≤ ξ 3 1 (n), i.e., the investment in asset 3 between t = 2 and t = 3 is bounded from above by the F 1 -measurable random variable ξ 3 1 . Consequently, the third summand in equation But then (4.3) reduces to
Taking j = 1/2, this implies ξ 3 1 (n) = −ξ 3 2 (n, m, i) and, consequently, v 1 ≡ 0. Hence ( Π t ) 3 t=0 satisfies (NA).
Step 3. Let us now show A t 0 ∩ − A T t ⊆ A T t for t = 1, 2, 3, 4 (for t = 0, there is nothing to show). This is akin to the proof in step 2. As in (4.2), we can restrict to portfolios which can be represented by transfers that do not trade at price a = 5. Indeed, since we only consider positions that can be liquidated for sure, the cancellation of a transfer at price a (with re-transfer at a later time to asset 1), would lead to a strict improvement and thus an arbitrage. Since this would contradict to the (NA) property of ( Π t ) 3 t=0 shown in
Step 2, we can exclude such silly trades in the following considerations.
By the arguments leading to (4.4), it follows that e 2 − e 1 ∈ − A 3 1 . Consequently, we have A 1 0 ∩ − A 3 1 = cone(e 3 − e 1 , e 4 − e 1 ) + L 0 (cone(e 1 − e 4 ), F 1 ) ⊆ A 3 1 . Now consider the case t = 2. Let w ∈ A 2 0 ∩− A 3 2 , i.e. we may write w = ξ 0 +ξ 1 +ξ 2 = − ξ 2 − ξ 3 for ξ 0 ∈ cone(e 2 − e 1 , e 3 − e 1 , e 4 − e 1 ), ξ 1 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 4 − e 1 ), F 1 ), ξ 2 , ξ 2 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 1 − π 31 2 e 3 , e 1 − π 41 2 e 4 ), F 2 ) and ξ 3 ∈ L 0 (cone(e 1 − π 21 e 2 , e 1 − π 31 e 3 ), F 3 ) with the restrictions ξ 3 0 + ξ 3 2 + ξ 3 2 ≥ 0, ξ 4 0 + ξ 4 1 ≥ 0 and ξ 4 0 + ξ 4 1 + ξ 4 2 + ξ 4 2 = 0. Indeed, this is a consequence of (NA) and the avoidance of silly trades. But, then we may consider v := w − w = ξ 0 + ξ 1 + ξ 2 − (− ξ 2 − ξ 3 ). Note that we have v i = 0 for i = 2, 3, 4, which uniquely determines v 1 as v 1 (n, m, i, j) = ξ On the other hand, we also have v 1 = 0. Since the first two terms do not depend on m ∈ N, we must have that Considering j = −1/2 and i = ±1/2, ξ 2 0 ≥ 0 implies that ξ 2 0 = 0 and ξ 3 0 − ξ 4 0 + ξ 4 1 (n) /n = 0 for all n ∈ N. Hence, ξ 4 0 = −ξ 4 1 (n) for all n ∈ N and ξ 3 0 = 0. Consequently, we also have ξ 3 2 (n, m, i) = ξ 3 2 (n, m, i) = 0. But, then we have shown w = 0, which is tantamount to A 2 0 ∩ − A 3 2 = {0} ⊆ A 3 2 . The same arguments apply for t = 3 and thus A 3 0 ∩ − A 3 3 = {0} ⊆ A 3 3 . Remark 4.4. Example 4.3 also allows us to discuss the following related question: Does the existence of a bid-ask process ( Π t ) T t=0 with Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T such that ( Π t ) T t=0 satisfies (NA) and T t=0 ξ t = 0 a.s. with ξ t ∈ L 0 (−K(Π t ), F t ) ⇒ ξ t ∈ L 0 (K 0 ( Π t ), F t ) for all t = 0, . . . , T (4.5) already imply the absence of an approximate arbitrage, i.e. A T 0 ∩ L 0 (R d + ) = {0}? Hereby (4.5) means that each transaction which is involved in a null-strategy in the original model is carried out at frictionless prices in the adjusted market.
It turns out that the answer to the question is negative. Indeed, in the setting of Example 4.3, we define the adjusted bid-ask process ( Π t ) 3 t=0 by
Π 2 = Π 2 and Π 3 = Π 3 . Then, we have Π t ≤ Π t a.s. for all t = 0, 1, 2, 3. In addition, the previously considered adjusted bid-ask process ( Π t ) 3 t=0 satisfies (NA) and yields better terms of trade than ( Π t ) 3 t=0 , i.e., A T 0 ⊆ A T 0 . Consequently, ( Π t ) 3 t=0 inherits the (NA) property. In addition, the only (up to multiplication with non-negative scalars) null strategy in the original market is (ϑ t − ϑ t−1 ) 3 t=0 = (e 4 − e 1 , e 1 − e 4 , 0, 0). Thus, condition (4.5) is satisfied, but, as we have shown,
The key observation is that the bid-ask process ( Π t ) 3 t=0 satisfies (4.5) but not (3.1) since by the extension of the market from (Π t ) 3 t=0 to ( Π t ) 3 t=0 new null-strategies occur. Indeed, it was a finding by Jacka, Berkaoui, and Warren [JBW08] (see the paragraph before Definition 3.2 therein) that it is not sufficient that the null-strategies in the original market are frictionless in the market extended by their "adjusted trading prices", i.e., it is not sufficient that (4.5) is satisfied. However, in their Example 3.3 with T = 1, a price adjustment Π such that (4.5) holds true turns out to be sufficient to obtain a closed set of attainable portfolio values (indeed, in Example 3.3 of [JBW08] , the price adjustment essentially consists of adding L 0 (cone(e 1 − e 2 ), F 1 ), which is already necessary to make the null-strategy (e 1 − e 2 , e 2 − e 1 ) = (e 2 − e 1 , e 4 /ω − e 1 + e 3 /ω − e 4 /ω + e 2 − e 3 /ω) of the original market frictionless in the extended market). On the other hand, Example 4.3 highlights why in the approach of [JBW08] it would not be sufficient to ensure that the null-strategies in the original market are frictionless in the extended market.
